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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this appeal is vested in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782-2(3).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue One: Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it granted Autoliv's
motion for leave to file an amended answer?
Standard of Review: "Whether to grant or deny a motion to amend is ca matter
within the broad discretion of the trial court'" which will not be disturbed absent '"an
abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice.'" Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, ^f 10, 53
P.3d 2, cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002) (quoting Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d
817, 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)).
Issue Two: Although in application the after-acquired evidence doctrine already
exists under Utah law, does it act only as a limitation on damages, or as a potential total
bar to liability?
Standard of Review: Whether the after-acquired evidence defense may limit
damages or completely bar liability is a question of law. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936
(Utah 1994) ("[Ajppellate courts have traditionally been seen as having the power and
duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction.").
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, a former at-will employee of Autoliv, has sued Autoliv for breach of

implied contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.1
[R. 001-22.] Plaintiff claims that, as required by Autoliv policy, in late March 2001 she
requested and received approval to use vacation time from her supervisor. [R. 005-09.]
She apparently claims that this oral promise created an implied contract that modified her
at-will employment such that Autoliv could not fire her for not showing up to work. [R.
005-16.] However, Plaintiff did not receive such approval, did not communicate with
Autoliv, did not return calls, and was terminated in April of 2001 for job abandonment.
[R.406.]
Beginning in late 2000 and up until March 2001, Plaintiff submitted numerous,
overlapping applications for short-term disability. [R. 1467, 1471-78, 1481, 1484, 148991, 1493-98.] In these applications, Plaintiff represented to Autoliv that between
November 2000 and March 2001 she was totally disabled and unable to work. See id.
Accordingly, Plaintiff did not work at all at Autoliv between November 2000 and March
2001. [R. 004-09.] However, during discovery in this action, Autoliv uncovered
substantial evidence indicating that Plaintiff, while representing to Autoliv that she was

1

Plaintiff initially brought an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim that has
been dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff also brought a claim styled "wrongful
termination" that is indistinguishable from her contract claims. Plaintiff has not alleged
a violation of any Utah public policy. [R. 009-22, 277-78.]
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totally disabled and unable to work (and thus receiving full pay under Autoliv's shortterm disability policy), made as many as 24 trips to Wendover, Nevada to gamble. [R.
742-52, 870-78, 1514-19, 1522-24.] Accordingly, Autoliv sought permission to amend
its Answer to assert an affirmative defense based on the after-acquired evidence doctrine
and to include counterclaims against Plaintiff for fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
[R. 1447-1547.] The trial court granted Autoliv's motion, and Autoliv subsequently filed
an Amended Answer.2 [R. 1196-97,1199-1222.] Plaintiff then brought the instant
Petition appealing the trial court's decision and requesting that the Court determine
whether the after-acquired evidence defense is recognized under Utah law.
II.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
Plaintiff served her Complaint in this matter in January 2002. Autoliv timely filed

its Answer. [R. 025-42.] Plaintiff eventually dismissed with prejudice her claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.3 Both sides then engaged in written
discovery.
Plaintiff claimed that as her STD leave was ending her supervisor gave her
permission, over the telephone, to not return to work and to take vacation time. [R. 803-

The after-acquired evidence affirmative defense in Autoliv's Answer reads: "All of
Plaintiffs claims are barred, and/or Plaintiffs damages are barred or limited by the
after-acquired evidence doctrine." [R. 1214.]
It is unclear how Plaintiff is calculating her damages as her only remaining claims are
~ contract claims. In her Complaint, Plaintiff claims to be suing Autoliv for $330 million
dollars (this is after subtracting the $125 million Plaintiff was claiming for emotional
distress (IIED), which claim Plaintiff dismissed with prejudice when Autoliv began
conducting discovery on the claim). [R. 021-22, 277-78.]
764369
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06, 813,815.] When Autoliv deposed Plaintiff on December 5, 2002, it pointed out that
there was no entry on her phone record on the date she allegedly called her supervisor to
request use of vacation time. [R. 813-15.] Plaintiff testified that she had placed this
phone call from her cell phone. [R. 813, 815.] Plaintiff did not have her cell records,
however, because she claimed she "could not remember" her own cell phone number,
and that this was "our whole problem." Id. Plaintiffs deposition was continued, among
other reasons, so that Plaintiff could obtain these records. [R. 786, 813.] Plaintiff then
claimed to have been unable to obtain her own cell phone records and told Autoliv to
subpoena them.
Autoliv subpoenaed the cell phone records. [R. 187-88.] These records, however,
also failed to show any record of the alleged call in question to Plaintiffs supervisor. [R.
824-25.] When questioned about this fact at her resumed deposition, Plaintiff testified
under oath that she must have made the call from her brother's cell phone [R. 823,
1484.] However, when Autoliv asked Plaintiff in an interrogatory for information
regarding her brother's cell phone, Plaintiff responded that her brother did not have a cell
phone. [R. 845-46.] Then, when Autoliv subpoenaed the brother's cell phone records,
Plaintiff moved to quash Autoliv's subpoena. [R. 339-40, 632-41, 654-55.]
As was noted above, Autoliv subpoenaed Plaintiffs cell phone records because
the alleged call was central to Plaintiffs version of events and Plaintiff was unable to
obtain them to produce to Autoliv. During its review of her subpoenaed cell phone
records, Autoliv discovered that numerous calls had been made from Plaintiffs cell

764369

4

phone from Wendover, Nevada, during the approximate five month period Plaintiff was
on paid short-term disability leave in 2000-01. [R. 742-52.] Although Plaintiff has
admitted that she enjoys gambling in Wendover, Plaintiff specifically testified under oath
that she never went to Wendover during the months of November 2000 through March
2001 (while receiving full pay from Autoliv under its short-time disability policy).
[R. 912, 920-27.]
Also during the first day of her deposition, Plaintiff testified that she had to
mortgage her home for money to live on after her termination, and listed the mortgage
and "the security of my home" as part of her economic damages. [R. 47-72, 470, 476.]
During this testimony, the only mortgage companies Plaintiff listed were Fleet Mortgage
and "American Quest." Autoliv could not locate an "American Quest," but issued a
subpoena to Fleet Mortgage on March 10, 2003. [R. 222-23.] Washington Mutual,
having acquired Fleet, received the subpoena and produced "all documents concerning,
relating to or referring to Sheri Colleen Pett," including mortgage and banking records.
Plaintiffs bank records from Washington Mutual showed that Plaintiff made credit/debit
card withdrawals and purchases in Wendover and Las Vegas on multiple occasions from
January 2001 through April 2001, the time period when Plaintiff claimed to be too sick to
work or was the around-the-clock caretaker of her sick brother. [R. 470, 479-81, 483,
1514-19.]
Based on this evidence, Autoliv also subpoenaed information from several hotels
in Wendover. These subpoenas produced evidence that on at least three occasions
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Plaintiff stayed in the Peppermill Hotel and Casino while she was on short-term
disability. [R. 1522-24.] Autoliv then discovered additional information regarding
Plaintiffs activities while she was on short-term disability leave when it subpoenaed her
banking records from Zion's Bank. Specifically, Plaintiffs Zion's records show that
Plaintiff made ATM withdrawals in Wendover and Las Vegas on more than twenty
occasions from November 2000 through mid-April 2001, when Plaintiff claimed to be
totally disabled and too sick to work or was allegedly caring for her brother. [R. 870-78.]
Accordingly, Autoliv sought to amend its Answer to assert an affirmative defense
based on the after-acquired evidence doctrine. [R. 1447-1547.] It also included
counterclaims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation against Plaintiff. [R. 1544-45.]
Because Autoliv brought its motion while the parties were still engaged in fact discovery,
there was no prejudice to either party or to the court's schedule, as no trial date has been
set. Moreover, because Autoliv had only just become aware of this information, it was in
the interest of justice to allow Autoliv to amend its answer to assert this affirmative
defense. After considering the briefs and oral argument from both parties, the trial court
granted Autoliv's motion on July 11, 2003. [R. 1196-97.] Plaintiff subsequently brought
the instant Petition appealing the trial court's decision.
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III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Autoliv's Short-Term Disability Policy
Autoliv has a very generous short-term disability leave policy that provides its

employees pay protection when they are temporarily totally disabled and unable to work.
In administering the policy, Autoliv relies on the honesty of its employees'
representations. Autoliv's short-term disability leave request forms contain the
following:
By signing the front of this form, I hereby certify, under
penalty of perjury, that the information on this form is true
and correct.... I understand that falsifying information on
this form will lead to the termination of my employment with
Autoliv ASP.
I understand that short-term disability is a benefit which
provides wage continuation and is reserved for those cases
that are truly "temporarily totally disabling"....

.. .1 understand that hospitalization is defined as inpatient, and
greater than 24 hours.
[R. 1464-65.] Plaintiff testified that she understood short-term disability was a benefit
reserved for those who are truly temporarily disabled.4 [R. 1467-68.]

4

Even when an employee cannot perform his or her specific job, Autoliv generally has
light duty positions available. Short-term disability is reserved for those who are truly
temporarily, totally disabled.
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Beginning in November of 2000, Plaintiff Goes on Short-Term Disability for
Three Months for a "Broken Foot''
Starting on November 18, 2000, Plaintiff went on short-term disability leave for a
broken foot. [R. 1484, 1489.] Based on representations made to Autoliv about Plaintiffs
condition, leave was approved for three months, through February 15, 2001. [R. 1484,
1490-91.] In her deposition, Plaintiff testified that while her foot was broken she could
not get around on crutches and could not walk. [R. 1467, 1469.] During this time,
however, on four separate days, cell phone calls were made from Wendover on Plaintiffs
cellphone. [R. 1504-10.] Also during this time, on twelve separate dates, Plaintiff made
purchases and ATM withdrawals at different locations in Wendover. [R. 870-73, 151617.]
Plaintiff Goes on Short-Term Disability for a
"Muscle Contusion" in Her Hand
On February 13, 2001, immediately before Plaintiffs short-term disability leave
for her "broken foot" was scheduled to end, Plaintiff submitted a short-term disability
form based on a muscle contusion in her right hand. [R. 1467, 1472-73.] Two days
before and one day after submitting this form, calls were made from Plaintiffs cell phone
in Wendover. [R. 1504.] One day before submitting this form, Plaintiff made a purchase
in Wendover, and one day after made an ATM withdrawal in Wendover. [R. 873, 1517.]
Plaintiff has Her Doctor Sign Two Separate Short-Term Disability Forms
for "Bronchitis" and Submits One and Saves the Other
On February 15, 2001, two days after submitting her request based on a "muscle
contusion," Plaintiff had her physician sign two short-term disability medical certification
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forms for acute bronchitis. [R. 1484,1493-94.] Plaintiff signed one of these forms and
submitted it to Autoliv on February 16, 2001. [R. 1467, 1471.] Plaintiff saved the other
form.
Plaintiff Submits a Short-Term Disability Request for Medication,
Breathing Treatment and Transplant
On February 18, 2001, Plaintiff submitted another short-term disability request to
Autoliv, this time based on her medication, breathing treatment, and because she
represented that she was going to give her brother a bone marrow transplant.5 [R. 1467,
1474-77.] Two days later, on February 20, 2001, phone calls were made from Plaintiffs
cell phone in Wendover. [R. 1504.] Plaintiff also made a purchase and an ATM
withdrawal in Wendover on this date. [R. 873, 1517.]
Plaintiff Submits Another Request Falsely Stating That She
is "Confined" to the Hospital
The next day, on February 21, 2001, Plaintiff submitted another short-term
disability request in which she represented that she could not breathe, that her medication
made her sick, and that she was "confined to Hospital U of U." [R. 1467, 1477-78.]
Plaintiff stated under oath that during this time in February she could not breathe, stayed
at home, could not drive, did not go out at all, and stayed in bed. [R. 1467, 1471-72.]
Plaintiff later admitted that she was not "confined" to the hospital at all, but was only
there "several hours" for a "doctor's appointment" with a doctor whose name she could
not remember. [R. 1467, 1478-80.]
5

Plaintiff never gave her brother a bone marrow transplant.
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One day after Plaintiff represented that she was "confined" to the hospital,
Plaintiff spent the night of February 22, 2001, at the Peppermill Hotel and Casino in
Wendover. [R. 1523.] The next day, February 23, 2001, phone calls from Plaintiffs cell
phone were made from Wendover, as well as an ATM withdrawal. [R. 873, 1504.]
Plaintiff then made another ATM withdrawal in Wendover on February 27, 2001.
[R. 873.]
Plaintiff Waits Three Weeks and Submits the Previously Signed
Short-Term Disability Form on "Bronchitis"
On March 9, 2001, Plaintiff signed and submitted the second short-term disability
certification that was signed by her doctor three weeks earlier. [R. 1484, 1494-96.]
Plaintiff spent the previous night, March 8, 2001, at the Peppermill Hotel and Casino in
Wendover. [R. 1524.] A call from Wendover from Plaintiffs cell phone was made on
March 9, 2001. [R. 1502.] Plaintiff made an ATM withdrawal in Wendover on March 9,
2001, and a purchase in Wendover on March 12, 2001. [R. 875, 1518.]
Plaintiff is Well Enough to Work but Does not Inform Autoliv and Instead
Continues Collecting Full-Pay for Short-Term Disability
Plaintiff was scheduled to work on March 17, 18, and 19, 2001, and by March 15,
2001, she was well enough to return to work. [R. 1467, 1470, 1482-83.]
Notwithstanding that she was well enough to work, Plaintiff did not inform Autoliv and
instead remained on short-term disability collecting her full pay.6 On March 19, 2001, a

Plaintiff worked three 12-hour shifts per week. Although this amounts to only 36 hours,
under Autoliv's generous policy, she was paid for 40 hours. Therefore, when Plaintiff
missed three consecutive days of work, she was in fact missing an entire week of work.
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day Plaintiff was scheduled to work, and again on March 20, 2001, phone calls were
made from Plaintiff s cell phone in Wendover. [R. 1502.] Plaintiff made an ATM
withdrawal in Wendover on March 20, 2001, and a purchase in Wendover on March 22,
2001. [R. 875, 1518.]
Plaintiff Submits Another Request Claiming "Asthma/Cough/Cannot
be Around Sick People"
One day later, on March 23, 2001, Plaintiff submitted another short-term disability
request stating "asthma/cough/cannot be around sick people/transplant April 9."
[R. 1467, 1481, 1484, 1497-98.] Yet in her deposition, Plaintiff testified that three days
later she went to Deseret Industries, a public thrift store, despite the fact that she had
represented to Autoliv that she could not come to work because she could not risk being
around people who might be sick. [R. 1404, 1485.] Also on March 26, 2001, calls were
made from Plaintiffs cell phone in Wendover, as well as an ATM withdrawal. [R. 875,
1502-03.]
Plaintiff made a purchase in Wendover on March 28, 2001. [R. 1519.] Plaintiff
spent the night of March 29, 2001, at the Peppermill Hotel and Casino in Wendover.
[R. 1522.] More calls from Wendover on Plaintiffs cell phone were made on March 30,
2001, as well as an ATM withdrawal. [R. 875, 1503.] Plaintiff made additional
purchases in Wendover on April 2, 2001, and an ATM withdrawal on April 9, 2001, from
Mesquite, Nevada. [R. 877, 1519.] On April 10, 11, and 16, 2001, Plaintiff made
purchases in Las Vegas, Nevada. [R. 1519.]
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Based on this New Evidence, Autoliv Filed a Motion for
Leave to Amend its Answer, which the Trial Court Granted
Based on this newly discovered evidence, Autoliv amended its Answer to assert an
affirmative defense based on the after-acquired evidence doctrine and to include
counterclaims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation against Plaintiff.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Autoliv's Motion for
Leave to File an Amended Answer to Assert an Affirmative Defense Based on the AfterAcquired Evidence Doctrine. The district court's decision to allow Autoliv to amend its
answer was both necessary and appropriate due to the liberal standard employed when
considering the amendment of pleadings and because justice required granting Autoliv's
motion. Autoliv brought its motion for leave to amend its Answer while the parties were
still engaged in fact discovery and no trial date had been set. In addition, because Autoliv

Plaintiff now apparently admits to certain trips to Wendover (which she had previously
denied under oath) and attempts to justify her behavior by arguing that in general,
people in wheelchairs and on crutches are able to go to Wendover. (Appellant Brief at
21.) Even if true, this does nothing to excuse or justify Plaintiffs conduct. Plaintiff
represented to her employer that she was too disabled to work, while she received full
pay under her employer's STD policy. Accordingly, Plaintiffs argument on this point,
despite being irrelevant, is unconvincing.
Finally, Plaintiff now alleges that her supervisor once learned that she was in Wendover
while she was on disability leave for her foot. (Appellant Brief at 23-24.) This
"allegation" is not contained in 1) any of Plaintiff s responses to Autoliv's discovery
requests; 2) Plaintiffs deposition; 3) any of the dozen or more motions Plaintiff filed;
or 4) anywhere else in the record. It appears for the first time in Plaintiffs appellate
brief. Furthermore, this allegation is not sworn testimony and is therefore not
admissible evidence. While it is disingenuous at best, it is completely irrelevant to
whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Autoliv to amend its answer.
764369
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had only just become aware of the new information regarding Plaintiffs misconduct, it
was in the interest of justice to grant Autoliv's motion.
On appeal, Plaintiff requests that the Court determine whether the after-acquired
evidence defense exists under Utah law either as a limitation on damages or as a
complete bar. Not only is this defense deeply anchored in American common law and
firmly supported by basic tenets of both contract and equitable jurisprudence, it is also
recognized under Utah law regarding at-will employment, contract performance, and
limitation of damages. In addition, the majority position and clear trend among the states
recognize the after-acquired evidence defense as a complete bar. Nearly every court that
has considered whether the after-acquired evidence defense applies to contract-based
employment actions has held that the defense acts as a complete bar to liability.
Accordingly, the Court should officially recognize the defense as a limitation, not only on
the calculation of damages, but as a complete bar to liability in contract-based
employment claims. Finally, this Court should adopt the preponderance of the evidence
standard as the applicable burden of proof required to establish the after-acquired
evidence defense because it is better-reasoned and the majority position.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN
GRANTING AUTOLIV'S MOTION TO AMEND ITS ANSWER,
Although Plaintiff entirely fails to address this issue in her appellate brief, the

question presented to the Court on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion
when it granted Autoliv's motion to amend its answer to assert an affirmative defense of
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after-acquired evidence. Because of the liberal standard employed to amend pleadings
under Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and because justice required granting
Autoliv's motion, the Court should hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
"Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure directs that leave to amend
pleadings 'shall be freely given when justice so requires.'" Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App
247, Tf 19, 53 P.3d 2, cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P.
15(a)). "It is well established that [R]ule 15 should be interpreted liberally so as to allow
parties to have their claims fully adjudicated." Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
"This is especially true when the motion to amend is made well in advance of trial." Id.
In the instant case, Autoliv brought its motion for leave to amend its Answer while
the parties were still engaged in fact discovery and no trial date had been set. In addition,
because Autoliv had only just become aware of the new information regarding Plaintiffs
misconduct, it was in the interest of justice to grant Autoliv's motion. "The rule in this
state has always been to allow amendments freely when justice requires, and especially is
this true before trial." Gillman v. Hansen, 486 P.2d 1045, 1046 (Utah 1971); see, e.g.,
Nunez, 2002 UT App 247 at ^f 33 (holding it was an abuse of discretion to deny motion to
amend in part because the party only discovered claim after learning additional facts in
discovery).
While not addressing the primary issue of whether the trial court abused its
discretion in granting Autoliv's motion, Plaintiff instead asks this Court to reverse the trial
court's ruling, arguing that Autoliv failed to meet its burden of proving the after-acquired
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evidence defense. Plaintiff seems to mistakenly believe that Autoliv has the burden of
proving a defense before it can amend its Answer. (Appellant Brief at 18-19.) However,
o

this is not the standard under Rule 15.
Under Plaintiffs theory, when a lawsuit is filed against a defendant, the defendant
would not even be able to file an answer and assert affirmative defenses without already
having proven those affirmative defenses.9 Plaintiff is apparently confusing the procedural
stage of when a party asserts an affirmative defense with the procedural stage of when a
party proves an affirmative defense. (Appellant Brief at 18-24.) The procedural stage of
Autoliv proving the affirmative defense has not yet arrived. Autoliv will offer its proof of
this defense in a later motion for summary judgment or at trial.10
Nor is it the standard under Rule 8 regarding the assertion of affirmative defenses. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c).
9

Similarly, Plaintiffs apparent contention that Autoliv is not entitled to plead alternative
theories and affirmative defenses (Appellant Brief at 24), is completely unsupported by
any authority, and is contrary to controlling law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2) ("A party
may ... state as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of
consistency...."). Therefore, contrary to Plaintiffs unsupported argument, Autoliv has
not admitted that it wrongfully terminated Plaintiff by asserting the after-acquired
evidence defense.

10

Even though Autoliv is not required to present evidence proving this affirmative
defense at this stage in the litigation, it could certainly do so as shown by the hotel
records, bank records, cell phone records, overlapping and fraudulent STD applications,
and Plaintiffs deposition testimony, as discussed above. Autoliv would have
terminated Plaintiff had it known of this misconduct. Again, Plaintiff represented to
Autoliv that she was unable to work so that she could collect her full pay while making
as many as 24 trips to Wendover. Autoliv's STD forms provide that falsifying
information will lead to termination. [R. 1464-65.] Moreover, Plaintiff herself has
testified that she understood that STD is a benefit reserved for those who were truly
disabled. [R. 1467-68.]
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In sum, the trial court properly focused on the applicable legal standard under Rule
15 when it granted Autoliv's motion for leave to amend its Answer. Because leave to
amend is freely granted under Rule 15 and the amendment was required in the interest of
justice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Autoliv's motion.
II.

GOVERNING PRINCIPLES AND HISTORICAL USE OF THE AFTERACQUIRED EVIDENCE DEFENSE.
A.

Definition and History of the After-Acquired Evidence Defense.

On appeal, Plaintiff requests that the Court determine whether the after-acquired
evidence defense exists under Utah law. The after-acquired evidence defense has
historically shielded employers from liability where, some time after an employee is
terminated, an employer first learns about employee wrongdoing that would have led to
discharge had the employer known of the wrongdoing. The defense "has its foundation
in the logic that an employee cannot complain about being wrongfully discharged
because the individual is no worse off than he or she would have been had the truth of his
or her misconduct been presented at the outset." Gassman v. Evangelical Lutheran Good
Samaritan Soc'y, Inc., 921 P.2d 224, 226 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996), rev 'd in part on other
grounds, 933 P.2d 743 (Kan. 1997).
Plaintiff incorrectly maintains that the after-acquired evidence doctrine "has no
basis in common law or historical precedence." (Appellant Brief at 7, 8.) On the
contrary, this doctrine has been established in American jurisprudence for at least the past
century. See O'Dav v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 959 P.2d 792, 795 (Ariz.
1998) (en banc); Stephen J. Humes, Annotation, After-Acquired Evidence of Employee's
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Misconduct as Barring or Limiting Recovery in Action for Wrongful Discharge, 34
A.L.R.5th 699 (1995) (citing numerous cases). "[A]fter-acquired evidence has been used
for many years by state and federal courts concerning issues governed by contract law."
Merritt B. Chastain III, Comment, The Guiding Light or Simply More Disarray?: A
Principled Analysis of the After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine After McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1107, 1116-17 (Nov. 1995) (citing
E.H. Taylor, Jr. & Sons v. Julius Levin Co., 274 F. 275, 282 (6th Cir. 1921); Carpenter
Steel Co. v. Norcross, 204 F. 537, 539-40 (6th Cir. 1913); Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844, 854 (9th Cir. 1954); Farmer v. First Trust Co., 246 F.
671, 673 (7th Cir. 1917)).11
The after-acquired evidence defense is rooted in well established principles of
contract law. "The overwhelming majority of courts hold that if an employer can
demonstrate that it would have fired an employee had it known of prior misconduct, then
the employee's claim for breach of contract is barred or, put differently, the prior
misconduct excuses the employer's breach." O'Day, 959 P.2d at 795. "This approach is
supported by several sections of the Restatement of Contracts, leading treatises, and a
century of case law." Id.
Specifically, under one basic tenet of contract law, "it is a condition of each
party's remaining duties to render performances to be exchanged under an exchange of

11

Plaintiffs contention that the after-acquired evidence doctrine emerged in 1988 is
incorrect. (Appellant Brief at 7, 8-10.)
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promises that there be no uncured failure by the other party to render any such
performance due at an earlier time." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 (1981).
Accordingly, "one party's material failure of performance has the effect of the nonoccurrence of a condition of the other party's remaining duties ... even though that other
party does not know of the failure." Id. § 237 cmt. c (emphasis added). Similarly, "[i]f a
party has the power to avoid the contract simply by disaffirmance, ... his refusal or
failure to perform is not a breach ... even if he is ignorant of his power of avoidance."
Id. § 385 cmt. a.
In fact, one of the Restatement's illustrations is directly on point:
A and B make an employment contract. After the service has
begun, A, the employee, commits a material breach of his
duty to give efficient service that would justify B in
discharging him. B is not aware of this but discharges A for
an inadequate reason. A has no claim against B for
discharging him.
Id. § 237 cmt. c, illus. 8 (emphasis added); see also O'Day, 959 P.2d at 795 (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 cmt. c, illus. 8 and describing it as "directly on
point" with regard to the after-acquired evidence doctrine); Chastain, supra, at 1180
n.263 ("In contract actions, if one party commits a material breach, the other party may
generally use it to justify nonperformance even if, at the time of its own nonperformance,
the second party was unaware of the first party's material breach.").
In other words, "after-acquired evidence of [the employee's] misconduct would,
under this rule, constitute a 'first breach' of the employment contract that would excuse
[the employer's] later breach." O'Day, 959 P.2d at 795; see also Gassman, 921 P.2d at
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230 (explaining that the after-acquired evidence doctrine is justified by the doctrine of
legal excuse); McDill v. Environamics Corp., 757 A.2d 162, 166 (N.H. 2000) ("A
number of jurisdictions have concluded that a complete bar [to liability] is appropriate
under well-established principles of contract law because the prior misconduct of the
employee excuses the employer's subsequent breach."). "To this day, almost no court
has challenged the assumption that these principles ought to apply to implied-in-fact
employment contracts." O'Dav, 959 P.2d at 796.
In addition to contract law, courts have offered several other bases for the afteracquired evidence defense, including the equitable doctrine of unclean hands. As the
Kansas Court of Appeals noted, "[t]he after-acquired evidence doctrine also conforms
with the fundamental maxim of equity that one who comes into equity must come with
clean hands." Gassman, 921 P.2d at 230; see also Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler &
Marmaro, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 329, 340 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (noting the court is looking "to
the doctrine of unclean hands for guidance" with respect to the after-acquired evidence
doctrine). Finally, "[ajnother established principle, residing primarily in the common
law, states that an employer may terminate an employee if legal grounds exist, whether or
not the employer knew of such grounds at the time of the discharge." Chastain, supra, at
1181 (citing Farmer v. First Trust Co. (In re Milwaukee Motor Co.), 246 F. 671, 673 (7th
Cir. 1917); Von Heyne v. Tompkins, 93 N.W. 901, 901-02 (Minn. 1903); Marnon v.
Vaughan Motor Co., 219 P.2d 163, 167 (Or. 1950) (en banc); Loos v. George Walter
Brewing Co., 129 N.W. 645, 646 (Wis. 1911)).
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In sum, the after-acquired evidence defense is deeply anchored in American
common law and is firmly supported by basic tenets of both contract and equitable
jurisprudence.
B.

After-Acquired Evidence as Applied to Employment Discrimination
Claims Brought Under Federal Law.

In the subsequent development and application of the after-acquired evidence
defense, a split among the federal circuit courts arose regarding the effect of the defense
in claims brought under federal discrimination statutes. To resolve the controversy, in
1995, the United States Supreme Court held that in discrimination cases arising under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), which was designed to deter and
eliminate workplace discrimination on the basis of age, the purpose of the Act would be
frustrated if the after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing barred all relief for a violation of
the Act. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co.. 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995).
Accordingly, the Court explained that in such cases, after-acquired evidence would not
act as a complete bar to the employer's liability; rather it would limit damages. Id.
The Court went on to explain that this evidence would still bear on the issue of
remedies. "In giving effect to the ADEA, we must recognize the duality between the
legitimate interests of the employer and the important claims of the employee who
invokes the national employment policy mandated by the Act. The employee's
wrongdoing must be taken into account,... lest the employer's legitimate concerns be
ignored." Id-at 361.
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Thus, the Court determined that "as a general rule in cases of this type, neither
reinstatement nor front pay is an appropriate remedy. It would be both inequitable and
pointless to order the reinstatement of someone the employer would have terminated, and
will terminate, in any event and upon lawful grounds." Id. at 361-62. "In determining
the appropriate order for relief, the court can consider taking into further account
extraordinary equitable circumstances that affect the legitimate interests of either party."
Id. at 362. Most significantly, the Court determined that any award of back pay should
be cut off at the time when the after-acquired evidence was discovered. Id. Accordingly,
due to the remedial purposes of the federal discrimination statutes, the after-acquired
evidence doctrine serves as a limitation on remedies, as opposed to a complete bar to
liability as it does in breach of contract cases.
C.

After McKennon* States Continue to Apply the After-Acquired
Evidence Defense as a Complete Bar to Employer Liability in
Contract-Based Employment Cases.

In the years after the McKennon decision, nearly all states addressing the issue
have determined that McKennon's limitations on the application of the after-acquired
evidence defense only apply to discrimination and other policy-based claims and not to
contract-based employment actions. "McKennon disallowed the use of after-acquired
evidence on the issue of liability in order to serve the public policy reasons underlying
ADEA and Title VII, which include deterrence of discrimination and compensation for
injuries caused by prohibited discrimination." Lewis v. Fisher Serv. Co., 495 S.E.2d 440,
444 (S.C. 1998). "Such public policy concerns, however, are not so prominently present
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in employee-employer contract disputes, which simply involve the rights of private
parties in relation to one another." Id. at 445.
Simply put, "[o]nce the discriminatory actions of the employer are eliminated
from the equation, we ultimately get back to the underlying principle that after-acquired
evidence is a complete bar to any recovery by the former employee where the employer
can show it would have fired the employee on the basis of the evidence." Gassman, 921
P.2d at 229. As one commentator explained,
The McKennon Court's analysis was driven principally by
the Court's concern that laws prohibiting impermissible
discrimination should be broadly interpreted to achieve their
remedial goals and further the public interest. The Court
understandably was reluctant to permit employers who acted
with an impermissibly discriminatory motive to shield
themselves from liability by relying on some lesser-form of
wrongdoing committed by the employee. However, in
ordinary employment disputes, no such special concerns
exist. Instead, employers' decisions to discipline an
employee usually implicate nothing more than the contractual
terms and conditions of employment. No overriding public
interest is involved, and no remedial statutes govern such
routine employment decisions. With this distinction in mind,
the majority of courts hold that after-acquired evidence bars
suit in ordinary wrongful termination cases.
Gregory S. Fisher, A Brief Analysis of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Cases:
A Proposed Model for Alaska (and Points South), 17 Alaska L. Rev. 271, 279 (2000).
Accordingly, "numerous courts have held that McKennon does not apply to
employment breach of contract cases, since breach of contract cases do not directly affect
public policy." Carroll v. Bayerische Landesbank, 150 F. Supp. 2d 531, 536 (S.D.N.Y.
2001); see also Gassrnan, 921 P.2d at 232 ("[U]nlike the policies underlying anti-
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discrimination statues, in ordinary breach of employment actions, there is no overriding
governmental interest in preventing breaches to limit the applicability of the afteracquired evidence doctrine."); Schuessler v. Benchmark Mktg. & Consulting, Inc., 500
N.W.2d 529, 541 (Neb. 1993) ("Breach of a contract does not give rise to the same
concerns or demand the same protections as does an action based on discrimination.").
Thus, the use of the after-acquired evidence doctrine remains a potential complete bar to
employer liability in post-McKennon contract-based employment claims.
III.

ALTHOUGH IN APPLICATION THE AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
DEFENSE ALREADY EXISTS UNDER UTAH LAW, THE COURT
SHOULD OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZE THE DEFENSE.
Utah law regarding at-will employment, contract performance, and calculation of

damages already recognizes the application of the "after-acquired evidence defense"
(even if not using this phrase), as a limitation on damages and a potential total bar to
liability. Accordingly, this Court should officially recognize the defense under Utah
law.12
A.

Utah Law Regarding At-Will Employment Already Implicitly
Recognizes the Application of the After-Acquired Evidence Defense,

First, the application of the after-acquired evidence defense is recognized under
Utah law regarding at-will employment. "At-will employment exists when the
employment contract contains no specified term as to duration and can be terminated at

Although these points were raised in Autoliv's Response to Plaintiffs Petition for
Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order, Plaintiff completely failed to rebut these
arguments or even address any aspect of Utah law in her appellate brief.
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the will of either the employer or employee." Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 919 P.2d
56, 60 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citing Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1041
(Utah 1989)). Absent an express agreement, employment is presumed to be at-will.
Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah 1992).
A plaintiff may rebut the presumption of at-will employment by proving the
existence of an implied-in-fact employment contract. See id. However, these implied
employment contracts, such as the one Plaintiff claims to exist between her and Autoliv
based on her supervisor's alleged oral comments, are defined to be very narrow and
specific under Utah law. See id. at 307. In fact, "[a]t-will employment is a bundle of
different privileges, any or all of which an employer can surrender," but the employer
retains the "at-will prerogative to fire" its employees "at any time for any other reason."
Id.
Accordingly, under Utah law as it already stands, Plaintiff may claim that an
implied-in-fact contract was created such that she could not be terminated for using her
vacation time which she claimed had been approved. However, even assuming that such
a contract was created (which it was not), Autoliv retained its at-will prerogative to fire
Plaintiff for any other reason at any time. Thus, even if Plaintiff could prevail on her
claim, Autoliv must also be allowed the opportunity to show that it would have
terminated Plaintiff earlier had it known of her fraudulent conduct. Autoliv retained its
"at-will prerogative" to fire Plaintiff "at any time for any other reason." Sanderson, 844
P.2d at 307 (emphasis omitted).
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B.

Utah Law Regarding Contract Performance Already Implicitly
Recognizes the Application of the After-Acquired Evidence Defense.

Second, the rationale of the after-acquired evidence defense as a potential total bar
to liability is already recognized in Utah law regarding contract performance. The
principle that the first party who fails to perform under a contract relieves the second
party's obligation to perform is well-established under Utah contract law. See, e.g.,
Aquagen Int'l Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411, 414 (Utah 1998) (citing to Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 237 when explaining that "[w]hen one party .. . commits an
c

uncured material failure5 in its performance of the contract, the non-failing party is

relieved of its duty to continue to perform under the contract"); see also Pack v. Case,
2001 UT App 232, % 18, 30 P.3d 436 (citing § 237); Grossen v. DeWitt, 1999 UT App
167, K 12 n.5, 982 P.2d 581 (same).13
Under Utah law, employment relationships are defined to be contractual in nature.
"An at-will employment relationship does not mean that there is no contract between
employer and employee. The at-will rule merely 'creates a presumption that any
employment contract which has no specified term of duration is an at-will relationship.'"
Cook, 919 P.2d at 60 (quoting Berube, 771 P.2d at 1044).
Thus, using the instant case as an example, Plaintiffs misconduct may serve to bar
Autoliv's liability for any later alleged breach on its part. As was set forth above,

13

These Utah cases cite to the same section of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
relied upon by one of the leading cases applying the after-acquired evidence doctrine.
See O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 959 P.2d 792, 796 (Ariz. 1998).
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"[w]hen one party to a valid contract commits an 'uncured material failure' in its
performance of the contract, the non-failing party is relieved of its duty to continue to
perform under the contract." Aquagen, 972 P.2d at 414. Accordingly, while Autoliv in
no way concedes that any implied-in-fact contract existed between it and Plaintiff, even if
there were such a contract, and even if it were breached by Autoliv, under basic
principles of contract law (which have been adopted in Utah), Plaintiffs earlier breach
relieved Autoliv of its obligation to perform. This outcome, implicitly applying the afteracquired evidence defense as a total bar to liability, follows or adheres to established
Utah contract law principles.
C.

Utah Law Regarding Calculation of Damages Already Implicitly
Recognizes the Application of the After-Acquired Evidence Defense,

Finally, the after-acquired evidence defense is already implicitly recognized in
Utah law regarding calculation of damages. Specifically, a plaintiff who proves a breach
of an implied-in-fact employment contract is entitled to contract damages. Sanderson,
844 P.2d at 307. "Damages recoverable for breach of contract include both general
damages, i.e., those flowing naturally from the breach, and consequential damages, i.e.,
those reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at
the time the contract was made." Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah
1985). "Moreover, concepts of foreseeability and mitigation apply." Peterson v.
Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1285 (Utah 1992).
" T o recover consequential damages, a non-breaching party must prove (1) that
consequential damages were caused by the contract breach; (2) that consequential
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damages ought to be allowed because they were foreseeable at the time the parties
contracted; and (3) the amount of consequential damages [are] within a reasonable
certainty.9" Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003 UT App 2 0 1 4 49, 71 P.3d 188, cert,
denied, 84 P.3d 239 (Utah 2003) (quoting Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, f 20, 990
P.2d 933). Thus, under these factors, an employee's consequential damages for breach of
an employment contract would be cut off at a certain date (including before the
termination in question) if, independent of the alleged breach, it could be demonstrated
that the employee would have retired, relocated, been terminated, or otherwise would
have ceased to work for the employer.
As the Utah Supreme Court has explained, "courts inevitably and routinely need to
determine damages associated with a breach of an indefinite employment contract. In
making such determinations, courts have relied on various factors," including, inter alia,
the employee's work life expectancy. Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 2002 UT 92, f
23, 54P.3d 1165; cf. Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co., Inc., 224 F.3d 1014, 1020-21 (9th
Cir. 2000) (holding plaintiff could not recover back or front pay beyond date at which she
voluntarily left the labor pool to care for her child).
The concept that consequential damages are limited to the amount of time the
employee reasonably would have been expected to remain employed by the employer is
further reflected in the Model Utah Jury Instructions for Damages for Breach of
Employment Contracts. The instruction provides, in relevant part, "[g]eneral damages
are the amount of compensation and benefits that the employee would have received
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from the employer during the period you find that the employment was reasonably
certain to have continued . . . ." MUJI 18.12 (1993) (emphasis added).14 Thus, even
under the model jury instructions, jurors are instructed to take into account how long
employment would have continued, thus allowing for the consideration of evidence that
includes any reason for terminating the employee.
In sum, the after-acquired evidence defense serves as both a limitation on damages
and as a potential total bar to liability, a concept firmly rooted in Utah lav/ regarding atwill employment, contract performance, and damage calculation.
IV.

THE APPLICATION OF THE AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DEFENSE
NOT ONLY IS SUPPORTED BY UTAH LAW BUT IS THE MAJORITY
POSITION AND CLEAR TREND AMONG THE STATES,
Not only is the after-acquired evidence defense supported by Utah law as a

limitation on damages and as a potential total bar to liability, the majority position and
clear trend among the states consider it a total bar to liability. Nearly every court that has
considered whether the after-acquired evidence defense applies to contract-based
employment actions has held that the defense acts as a complete bar to liability. As one
treatise has explained, "[t]he overwhelming majority of courts hold that if an employer
can demonstrate that it would have fired any employee had it known of prior misconduct,
then the employee's claim for breach of contract is barred." 5 Modern Tort Law:
Liability and Litigation § 44:87 (2d ed.) (2003); see also O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas

14

For the Court's convenience, this model jury instruction is attached hereto as part of
the Addendum.
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Helicopter Co., 959 P.2d 792, 795 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc) ("The overwhelming majority
of courts hold that if an employer can demonstrate that it would have fired an employee
had it known of prior misconduct, then the employee's claim for breach of contract is
barred or, put differently, the prior misconduct excuses the employer's breach.").
Accordingly, this Court should officially recognize the after-acquired evidence defense as
a potential complete bar to liability in contract-based employment claims.15
Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
and South Carolina have all held that the after-acquired evidence doctrine may act as a
total bar to liability in breach of employment contract actions. See O'Day v.
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 959 P.2d 792, 796 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc) (applying
after-acquired evidence doctrine to breach of employment contract actions as a potential
bar to liability); Crawford Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. Weissman, 938 P.2d 540, 542 (Colo.
1997) (en banc) (adopting after-acquired evidence doctrine in context of resume fraud
and holding it barred the plaintiffs claims of breach of implied contract and promissory
estoppel); Schiavello v. Delmarva Sys. Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 110, 114 (D. Del. 1999)
(holding "that after-acquired evidence of resume fraud is a complete defense to a claim
of breach of contract"); Gassman v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, Inc.,
921 P.2d 224, 232 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (adopting after-acquired evidence doctrine as a
bar to employer liability in ordinary breach of employment contract actions), rev 'd in

15

Plaintiffs assertion that "the majority of the state courts ... have failed to recognize or
legitimize this draconian doctrine" (Appellant Brief at 14) is simply wrong.
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part on other grounds, 933 P.2d 743 (Kan. 1997); Diamondhead Country Club &
Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Montjoy, 820 So.2d 676, 685-86 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that employer may present evidence supporting the employee's dismissal even
if not known to the employer at the time of dismissal); Schuessler v. Benchmark Mktg.
& Consulting, Inc., 500 N.W.2d 529, 541 (Neb. 1993) (holding that in breach of
employment contract action, "[i]f an employer proves, through post-termination
evidence, that the employee engaged in pre-termination misconduct that would have
resulted in the justified termination of the employee, the employee may not recover
wrongful discharge damages"); McDill v. Environamics Corp., 757 A.2d 162, 166
(N.H. 2000) (holding that in a breach of contract action, after-acquired evidence of
employee misconduct is a defense and can act as a complete bar to liability); Lewis v.
Fisher Serv. Co., 495 S.E.2d 440, 445 (S.C. 1998) (holding after-acquired evidence
doctrine is a defense to liability in employee handbook breach of contract actions); see
also Carroll v. Bayerische Landesbank, BLB, 150 F. Supp. 2d 531, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(explaining that under New York law, an employer has a complete defense to a breach
of employment contract case when there is a flagrant act of dishonesty that seriously
affects the employer's interest that continued during the service); 30 CJ.S. EmployerEmployee § 86 ("After-acquired evidence of employee misconduct bars recovery for
wrongful discharge."); Gregory S. Fisher, A Brief Analysis of After-Acquired Evidence
in Employment Cases: A Proposed Model for Alaska (and Points South), 17 Alaska L.
Rev. 271, 272 (2000); cf. Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 413 (6th
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Cir. 1992) (explaining that under Michigan law, "just cause for termination of
employment may include facts unknown to the employer at the time of dismissal,
though obviously such facts would be neither the actual nor inducing cause for the
discharge"), questioned on other grounds, McKennon v. Nashville Banner PubPg Co.,
513 U.S. 352 (1995); Leahev v. Fed. Express Corp., 685 F. Supp. 127, 128 (E.D. Va.
1988) (explaining that under Virginia law, "it has long been established that just cause
for termination may include facts and circumstances not known to the employer");
Bradley v. Philip Morris Inc., 486 N.W.2d 48, 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) ("Just cause for
termination may include facts and circumstances existing at termination but not known
to the employer."), aff'd after remand, 513 N.W.2d 797 (Mich. 1994); but see Preston v.
Phelps Dodge Copper Prods. Co., 647 A.2d 364, 365, 368-70 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994)
(while making no distinction between employment contract and wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy claims, the court held that after-acquired evidence could act as
a limitation on damages). In addition, California has adopted the doctrine in the context
of a wrongful discharge claim. Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, 41
Cal.Rptr.2d 329, 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
In sum, not only does Utah law implicitly recognize the application of the afteracquired evidence defense as a potential bar to any liability, but the clear trend, and the
majority position among other states, adopts the defense as a bar to contract-based
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employment actions. Accordingly, this Court should officially recognize the defense as a
total bar to liability for contract-based employment claims.16

16

Plaintiffs assertion that the after-acquired evidence doctrine has been adopted by only
seven states is simply wrong. (Appellant Brief at 7, 9-10.) Plaintiff has cited no case
where a state court has rejected the doctrine outright, i.e., not applied it as either a
limitation of damages or as a total bar to liability. In addition to the cases cited above, a
variety of states has analyzed the after-acquired evidence doctrine in relation to state
law public policy-based claims. Although Plaintiff has not brought a claim for
wrongful termination in violation of public policy or any other public policy-based
claim, this information may aid the Court in its analysis.
"A number of jurisdictions have balanced state public policy concerns and employers'
lawful prerogatives in hiring, promoting, and discharging their employees by applying
the McKennon standard in state retaliatory discharge cases, thereby limiting the
application of the after-acquired evidence doctrine to the issue of damages." Riddle v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 998 P.2d 114, 120 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (citations omitted); see
also McDill, 757 A.2d at 166 ("In wrongful termination tort cases, many jurisdictions
apply the after-acquired evidence doctrine only to mitigate an employee's damages.").
Arizona, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Texas, and West Virginia
have all held that the after-acquired evidence doctrine may be used to limit damages in
cases in which state public policy-based claims were involved. See Thompson v.
Better-Bilt Aluminum Prods., 927 P.2d 781, 788-89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Walters v.
United States Gypsum Co., 537 N.W.2d 708, 711 (Iowa 1995); Riddle, 998 P.2d at 120;
Wright v. Rest. Concept Mgmt, Inc., 532 N.W.2d 889, 893 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995);
Taylor v. Inf 1 Maytex Tank Terminal Corp., 810 A.2d 1109, 1118 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2002); McCarthy v. Pall Corp., 625 N.Y.S.2d 296, 296 (N.Y. App. Div.
1995); Reinach v. Wisehart 619 N.Y.S.2d 14, 14 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Trico Techs.
Corp. v. Montiel 949 S.W.2d 308, 312 (Tex. 1997); Barlow v. Hester Indus., Inc., 479
S.E.2d 628, 643 (W. Va. 1996); see also 30 C.J.S. Employer § 86.

Again, because Plaintiff has not brought a claim for wrongful termination in violation of
public policy or any other public policy-based claim, the holdings of these cases do not
apply to the case at bar. Accordingly, Plaintiffs "Wrongful Termination For Free
Card" argument and her claim that the after-acquired evidence doctrine "simply gives
employers another way to discriminate against employees with impunity" (Appellant
Brief at 7), are not only incorrect, but entirely inapposite to the issue before the Court.
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V.

LEGAL PARAMETERS OF THE AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
DEFENSE,
In addition to formally recognizing the after-acquired evidence defense as a

complete bar to liability in contract-based employment claims under Utah law, the Court
should also determine the burden of proof necessary to establish the defense. The Court
should follow the majority rule and adopt the preponderance of the evidence standard.
The Ninth Circuit has determined that an employer's burden of proof in an afteracquired evidence case is to be established by a preponderance of the evidence. O'Day v.
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 760-61 (9th Cir. 1996). The court
explained that "[njowhere in McKennon does the Supreme Court suggest that employers
bear a particularly heavy burden in this context; throughout the opinion the Court refers
only to what employers must 'establish.'" Id. at 760. The Ninth Circuit further reasoned
that because "the mixed-motive employer need only meet the preponderance of the
evidence standard at the remedy stage," there is "no reason the after-acquired evidence
employer should have to meet a higher standard." Id. at 761. Other courts have similarly
determined that after-acquired evidence must be established by a preponderance of the
evidence. See Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250, 255 (7th Cir. 1992);
Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614, 616 n.5 (4th Cir. 1984); Preston v.
17

Plaintiff contends that this Court must itself take on the task of crafting all of the
detailed particulars associated with this defense, such as drafting jury instructions.
(Appellant Brief at vi-vii.) While the Court certainly could choose to do so, it is not the
Court's obligation, and Plaintiff has not cited to any authority demonstrating otherwise;
rather, under generally-recognized principles, it is the Court's role to rule on the issue in
a way that conveys the applicable burdens and legal parameters.
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Phelps Dodge Copper Prods. Co., 647 A.2d 364, 368-69 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994). In
addition, many courts adopting the after-acquired evidence defense as a total bar to
liability in contract-based employment claims have not discussed the applicable standard
of proof. This indicates that the preponderance of the evidence standard that generally
applies to such civil actions also applies to the defense.
South Carolina is apparently the only state that has adopted the clear and
convincing evidence standard. Lewis v. Fisher Serv. Co., 495 S.E.2d 440, 445 (S.C.
1998). Another state court has stated in dicta that it may consider adopting a heightened
burden of proof. See Brogdon v. City of Klawock, 930 P.2d 989, 992 (Alaska 1997).
In addition to its being the strong majority position, several commentators have
further explained the appropriateness of the preponderance of the evidence standard. One
commentator explained that a heightened burden of proof conflicts with the employer's
right to discipline employees, which is based upon a reasonableness standard. "An
employer's good faith belief is all that is necessary to justify an employment decision."
Fisher, supra, at 292. "In addition, bad faith is not established simply because the
employer chooses to disbelieve the employee's version of events." Id. at 293. "To
require employers to establish grounds through clear and convincing evidence would
conflict with all of these basic principles." Id. In addition, it could be confusing for
juries to apply two different burdens of proof to two similar factual determinations, "one
forming the basis for the initial and allegedly wrongful decision, and the second forming
the basis for imposing discipline based on after-acquired evidence." Id.
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Furthermore, "imposing a heightened burden of proof ignores practical realities of
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unrealized, to drive the development of the law. Our approach reaches a fair balance of
legitimate interests." Id.18
In sum, the Court should adopt the preponderance of the evidence standard in
applying the after-acquired evidence defense, thereby following both a better-reasoned
approach and the majority position.19
VI.

ALTHOUGH NOT RELEVANT TO THIS INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL,
AUTOLIV HAS CONDUCTED DISCOVERY IN THE UTMOST GOOD
FAITH,
In her brief, Plaintiff raises the concern that in some instances employers will use

the after-acquired evidence doctrine as an excuse to comb through all aspects of an

Accordingly, Plaintiffs lengthy focus on the remote possibility that employers may
look for "minor or trivial" evidence detracts from her position that the defense does not
exist under Utah law and should not be recognized. (Appellant Brief at 13-14.) As was
outlined above, there is no indication that such abuse would in fact take place.
Moreover, because "minor or trivial" evidence would not provide a basis for
termination, it is not in the employer's interest to search for such evidence. Finally, the
severity and extent of Plaintiff s misconduct at Autoliv undermine Plaintiffs arguments
on this point. As was outlined above, Plaintiff made numerous misrepresentations to
Autoliv in order to receive full pay while not working. This is not a "minor or trivial"
incident or omission, but rather is a pattern of intentional and serious fraudulent
behavior.
Plaintiffs apparent contention that evidence must be "undisputed" in order for the
after-acquired evidence defense to apply is without merit and is not supported by the
authority Plaintiff cites. (Appellant Brief at 20.) Instead, Plaintiff apparently has
confused the defense's application with the issue of whether summary judgment was
properly granted on the defense in a particular case. For example, Plaintiff cites
Gassman, where the court held that the after-acquired evidence doctrine could be
applied to the case, but that summary judgment on the defense was improper due to
disputed issues of material fact regarding the defense. 921 P.2d at 233-34. Similarly, in
McKennon, the other case relied upon by Plaintiff, the Court both adopted the afteracquired evidence doctrine and reversed the circuit court's affirmance of the trial court's
grant of summary judgment on the defense. 513 U.S. at 355.
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employee's life. While it is possible that bad faith discovery could occur, this is true for

established by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See I Jtah R Ci\ P 26(b) (c i itlining
discovery scope and limits); Utah R. Civ P. 26(c) (outlining procedures to obtain
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In i fact. as tl lis case den lonstrates, attet i lpted abuses of the discovery process are
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the phone call Plaintiff alleged to haw- m.:idc to her supervisor in which he allegedly
granic . her permission to take vacation time was not on her home phone records,
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Plaintiff testified under oath that it was because she called from her cell phone. [R. 81315.] When Autoliv subpoenaed Plaintiffs cell phone records and there was no record of
the alleged call, Plaintiff changed her story and testified under oath that she must have
made the call from her brother's cell phone. [R. 823, 1484.] However, when Autoliv
asked Plaintiff in an interrogatory for information regarding her brother's cell phone,
Plaintiff responded, again under oath, that her brother did not have a cell phone. [R. 04546.] Then, when Autoliv subpoenaed Plaintiffs brother's cell phone records, Plaintiff
moved to quash Autoliv's subpoena. [R. 339-40, 632-41, 654-55.]
Because this alleged phone call is central to Plaintiffs claims, it is entirely
disingenuous of Plaintiff to now assert that Autoliv subpoenaed these records "[i]n its
never-ending search into Ms. Pett's personal life." (Appellant Brief at 13.) In fact,
Plaintiffs claim that "[t]his case is a perfect example of how employers misuse and abuse
the 'after-acquired evidence defense'" (Appellant Brief at 14) could not be further from
the truth. On the contrary, this case demonstrates the necessity and propriety of the afteracquired evidence defense, which serves to protect employers from employees who had
been actively defrauding them prior to their termination.
In this case, after Plaintiff sued Autoliv for $455 million dollars, Autoliv learned
that, while employed, Plaintiff had been repeatedly misrepresenting her situation to
Autoliv in order to receive full pay through Autoliv's generous short-term disability
program. For example, Plaintiff represented to Autoliv that she was "confined to
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21

Suffice it to say that Plaintiffs numerous accusations regarding the propriety of the
subpoenas Autoliv has issued are misleading and incorrect. As yet another example,
Plaintiff alleges that Autoliv "subpoenaed the records of American Mortgage Company,
even though Ms. Pett never had a mortgage with American Mortgage Company."
(Appellant Brief at 13.) However, the record evidence in this case demonstrates that on
December 5, 2002, Plaintiff testified that she mortgaged her home for money to live on
after hei (ei minaiion, and listed the mortgage and "the security of my home" as part of
her economic damages j"R. 470-72, 4V(>. ] During this same day of testimony, the only
mortgage companies Plaintiff mentioned were Fleet Mortgage and "American Quest."
Autoliv could not locate "American Quest." Then, on the second day of her deposition,
Plaintiff changed her air.ver ^ r r : "-\merican Quest" to "American Mortgage." [R.
477,493. j
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Autoliv was forced to devote significant time and resources responding to Plaintiffs
motions.22
In sum, although Plaintiff attempts to paint an entirely different picture, the
undisputed evidence demonstrates that Autoliv has acted with the utmost good faith while
conducting discovery in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, the Court should officially recognize that the afteracquired evidence defense exists in Utah and acts as a complete bar to contract-based

Finally, although irrelevant to the instant appeal, Plaintiffs allegations regarding
Autoliv's delays in this case are completely without merit. As noted above, Plaintiff
served her Complaint in this matter in January of 2002. Autoliv answered within the
time provided by the Rule. Notwithstanding that it was Plaintiffs obligation, Autoliv's
counsel initiated the Rule 26 attorney planning conference, drafted an Attorney
Planning Report, and sent it to Plaintiffs counsel. Because Plaintiffs counsel stated
that he had had a fire at his home in which the Attorney Planning Report may have been
lost, Autoliv's counsel voluntarily amended the Attorney Planning Report to give
Plaintiffs counsel additional time, and again sent it to him. Plaintiffs counsel then
"misplaced" the Attorney Planning Report and did not return it to Autoliv's counsel
until June 2, 2002. Therefore, there was significant delay that had nothing to do with
Autoliv, and there were significant extensions to accommodate Plaintiffs counsel, prior
to the entry of the Scheduling Order. After the entry of the Scheduling Order, discovery
was first extended because Plaintiffs deposition had to be continued because Plaintiff
had not properly responded to Autoliv's request by producing documents necessary to
conclude her deposition. Discovery was extended on a second occasion because
Plaintiffs counsel called Autoliv's counsel shortly before the discovery cutoff wanting
to depose a number of Autoliv's employees. Autoliv's counsel told Plaintiffs counsel
that that would require an extension of discovery, but that Autoliv was happy to
accommodate Plaintiff. In an effort to better ensure that things were done timely,
Autoliv's counsel prepared the various stipulations, just as it did the various Attorney
^ Planning Reports. (Letters and deposition pages setting forth the above sequence of
events are found at R. 782-92.)
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employment claims, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted
AuMln', mnliiiii Ini leave lu lile an amended answer.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED
Autoliv requests oral argument in order to fully explain the after-acquired
evidence defense and the record below to aid the Court in its analysis.
ADDENDUM
1.
DATED

.. • Instructions, 18.12 «1
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1.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER

r,

Janet Hugie Smith
Frederick R Toiler
Attorneys for Autoliv ASP, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE AUTOLIV ASP, INC. was mailed, postage prepaid, via U.S. Mail on this
_____ day of May, 2004 to the following:
Charles A. Schultz, Esq.
222 West 700 South
Brigham City, UT 84302
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EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE RIGHTS

18.12
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DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
If an employer has terminated the employee in breach of an
express or implied contract, you may award t h e employee both
general and consequential damages..
General damages are the amount of compensation and benefits
that the employee would have received from the employer during
the period you find that the employment was reasonably certain to
have continued, less any amounts that the employer proves the
employee received or could have received with reasonable effort
from other employment during the same period.
Consequential damages are those damages that were within the
contemplation of the parties or were reasonably foreseeable by the
parties at the time the contract was made. That is, consequential
damages are damages (other than lost compensation, and benefits)
that directly flow from, the employer's breach, of the employment
agreement.
Commei its
Attorney fees may be available as consequential damages in employment
contract lawsuits. Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 837 (Utah 1992),
References:
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 77: P.2d 1033 <I":^^ " «v"i
Erickson v. PI, 73 Cal. App. 3d 850 (1977)
Parker v. Twentieth Century Fox FiLn Corp., 3 * "al. 3d 176 (1970)
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